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Abstract 
This paper considers one of the paradoxes of incentive pay used in Britain’s public services, 
namely that despite much evidence that it does not motivate employees, it continues to be 
widely used. It is argued that behind this evidence, there are significant examples in which its 
use has been associated with improved performance. A good part of this is to be explained by 
the way performance pay links pay and appraisal, and the pressure this puts on line managers 
to set clearer goals for their staff. There is also some evidence that the goal setting is the 
outcome of a form of integrative, or positive sum, negotiation between individual employees 
and their managers, and that it is not just ‘top down’. 
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1. What Was the ‘Decision Problem’? 
 
Pay accounts for a very large fraction of public expenditure, and therefore its potential use to 
motivate performance has long attracted interest. Its long-established predecessor, ‘pay for 
grade’, was widely thought to take people’s motivation for granted. Although administratively 
simple, to most employees, it offered only a small number of seniority-based pay increments 
within grades coupled with limited opportunities for promotion. The Priestley Commission 
had observed in 1955 that arrangements for departing from the normal rate of pay and pay 
progression were ‘directly related to special duties or specific qualifications’ although 
increments could be withheld for ‘serious inefficiency or disciplinary offences’ (Priestley, 
1955 §21). Priestley had considered pay for performance, but rejected it on practical grounds: 
in most Civil Service jobs the merit of individual contributions could not easily be identified, 
and the inevitable involvement of the staff associations would lead to discussion of its 
application to individual cases (§24). The Commission did envisage one exception: that of 
draughtsmen whose increased proficiency could be ascertained by additional qualifications 
(§319). Nevertheless, the idea of pay for performance was taken up again by a series of 
government pay bodies, before it became one of the key recommendations of Megaw in 1982. 
Thus although recent debates have tended to associate the principle of linking pay to 
performance with the radicalism of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, concern about the 
underlying issues has a long history. Moreover, interest has not been confined to the UK. A 
major OECD study (OECD, 2005) shows that many OECD countries have experimented with 
different methods of linking pay to performance in recent years, as well as with many 
different ways of implementing it. Therefore, if we are to understand the paradox behind the 
question implicit in the title, we need to look for longer-run concerns than the passing 
political ideologies of particular governments. 
 
The Megaw inquiry provides a good starting point because it gave the final push to 
implementing performance-related pay systems on a wide scale in the British public services. 
It summarised the key arguments in their favour put forward in the evidence it received. In 
themselves, those arguments offered nothing particularly radical or new. It would be desirable 
to have a ‘more effective means of rewarding good performance and penalising poor 
performance’ than promotion and downgrading. It was inequitable to reward good and poor 
performance equally. The limited number of promotions in the Civil Service meant that 
promotion alone could not be expected to motivate the majority of staff. In the Civil Service 
in the 1980s, promotion into middle management jobs was very slow for most employees, and 
would have been exacerbated by ‘de-layering’ of middle management jobs in the following 
decade.
1 Finally, many private sector organisations operated successful performance-pay 
systems (Megaw, 1982 §326). The first three arguments identify the decision problem as 
dealing with a reward system that was failing to motivate public employees, and whose 
inequities could quite conceivably demotivate them. The final argument really takes up the 
practicalities that had led the Priestley Commission to reject linking pay to performance: if 
private firms, which are themselves often large bureaucracies, can operate such reward 
systems effectively, then surely the practical problems are soluble. 
 
The emphasis in Megaw, as in much subsequent discussion of performance pay, has focused 
on individual employees, their incentives, and equity considerations. There is another 
important strand in the theoretical literature on performance, from organisational economics, 
                                                 
1 Using data from the National Audit Office, in the 1980s, the period leading up to the introduction of 
performance pay, in the UK civil service administrative group, a newly promoted Senior Executive Officer could 
expect to wait, on average, over 20 years to be promoted to Principal, the first grade with significant managerial 
responsibilities. Promotion rates into the SEO grade were even slower (NAO, 1989). 2 
 
namely the structure of principal-agent relations within large sections of the public sector. It is 
argued for example by Tirole (1994) that the multiple demands on government organisations 
often lead to a lack of clarity in organisational goals. Multiple principals, or in the language of 
politics, multiple stakeholders, mean that large government departments responsible for 
administering a wide range of services often face contradictory goals, and that demands from 
one set of stakeholders often override those of others part-way through the process of 
implementation. In the UK, clarifying the role of the principal was really the job of the Ibbs, 
‘Next Steps’ report of 1988, which proposed that central government should be restructured 
into a set of bodies each with a clearer and more limited set of goals (Efficiency Unit, 1988). 
 
On the whole, the Megaw and Ibbs reports did not devote much thought to the link between 
performance pay schemes for the great majority of public servants and the restructuring of 
organisational goals. Yet, it is evident that if organisational goals are unclear, it is going to be 
hard to be clear about the job-level objectives of individual employees. Indeed, it is notable 
that when the Megaw report discussed performance measurement at the individual level, it did 
so in terms of making use of the existing employee performance appraisal system and 
adapting it. This graded employee performance according to a number of department-wide 
criteria. It is as if employee performance could be embraced within the American public 
service concept of ‘neutral competents’ (see Kaufman, 1956: 1060; Heclo, 1975: 81): within 
the government machine each employee has a predetermined job to be done, like a cog in an 
engine. This may be undertaken with varying degrees of competence and motivation, just as 
cog in an engine might encounter varying degrees of friction which affect overall efficiency. 
However, as with a car, direction is determined by the actions of the driver, and the parts of 
the engine continue to function in the same way. As we shall see later, one of the innovations 
with performance management has been to focus more on job-level objectives and how they 
can be adapted. 
 
This chapter argues that the intended consequence or perhaps more correctly, anticipated 
consequence of performance-related pay -  to improve the motivation of public servants - has 
proved elusive. When a policy is the result of decisions by many actors, it is not clear whose 
intentions were paramount. In contrast, the unintended or unanticipated consequence was that 
although performance appears to have improved in several cases, it did so by other means 
than motivation. Notably, it came about because of the emergence of processes facilitating 
convergence between goal setting at the individual and organisational levels. These have 
supported a renegotiation of performance standards and priorities at the individual level. This 
did not come about overnight, but progressively as successive governments and generations 




2. The Story 
 
The story of performance pay in the UK civil service comprises two sub-plots: one at the 
individual level, and the other at the organisational level. At the individual level, the big step 
forward in the introduction of performance related pay came just after the General Election of 
June 1987, which gave the government scope to proceed with its policy of focusing pay on 
‘merit, skill and geography’. The Civil Service unions’ campaign of industrial action came to 
an end after the election, and within a short space of time, several major unions had reached 
pay agreements with the Treasury that accepted some elements of pay for performance. An 
agreement with the FDA (top civil servants’ union) accepted a merit points system for senior 
managers, an agreement with the Institute of Professional Civil Servants in 1987 accepted 
performance pay for non-industrial civil servants, and an agreement with the Inland Revenue 3 
 
Staff Federation in 1988 saw the introduction of performance pay for middle-ranking Inland 
Revenue staff, responsible for assessing and collecting taxes (IDS, 1987; 1988). The latter 
two agreements introduced the first large-scale performance pay schemes for British civil 
servants in the twentieth century. Among the stated aims of the Inland Revenue agreement 
were: ‘to provide incentives for improving and maintaining efficiency in the Inland Revenue’ 
and ‘to reward sustained high performance’ (Inland Revenue, 1989: para 5). In both 
agreements, the system consisted of provisions for accelerated annual pay increments and 
additional increments for those at their scale maximum, based on performance appraisals by 
employees’ line managers.  
 
Improvements in the link with appraisal 
A notable feature of these early performance pay schemes was expressed in the words of an 
official of the then IRSF: they had been ‘bolted onto’ the existing employee performance 
appraisal system, in the manner originally envisaged by Megaw. The operation of one of these 
was studied in detail by the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP), that of the Inland 
Revenue. The 1991 study was funded by the Inland Revenue Staff Federation but with full 
cooperation from Inland Revenue management which distributed the questionnaire and 
allowed staff to complete the questionnaires during working time (Marsden and Richardson, 
1994). CEP researchers went back to the Inland Revenue five years later, in 1996, with a 
similar survey of the revised and restructured performance pay scheme, introduced in 1993 
(see Marsden and French, 1998). 
 
The initial experience of public service performance pay was summarised by a government 
report, surveying both academic research findings and inside management information, which 
observed a ‘stark contrast between approval of the principle and disenchantment with the 
practice of performance pay’ (Makinson, 2000: 3). 
2 The CEP found that in the Inland 
Revenue, the Employment Service, and two NHS hospital trusts it surveyed, around 60% of 
employees expressed agreement with the principle of performance pay, while the figure 
among head teachers was about half of that. Much smaller percentages of employees (about 
one fifth) thought that it had motivated them. Compared with that, high percentages of 
employees in each service covered thought that their scheme was divisive and unfair in the 
way it operated. Between roughly 50% and 85% of employees in the organisations surveyed 
by the CEP thought that performance pay had caused jealousies in their workplace (Marsden 
and French, 1998: 8). Even taking account of the more positive findings of Dowling and 
Richardson (1997) among NHS managers, the commonest failing appeared to lie in a 
widespread dissatisfaction with the operation of performance pay. It would be tempting to 
stop the story here, and conclude that the Priestley Commission had been vindicated: the 
practical difficulties of making performance pay work in a public sector environment were too 
great and the numbers of employees who were motivated by it, too small to justify the all the 
management time and effort required to make it work. 
 
However, this was not Makinson’s conclusion in 2000, nor was it that of a Cabinet Office 
report produced about the same time (Bichard, 1999). Both recommended further 
development and experimentation with different forms of performance pay, albeit along 
different paths. How could this be so? Two clues could be found in the CEP’s study of the 
Inland Revenue’s 1988 scheme. The first harks back to the inequities of the old system that 
were noted by Megaw. A majority of the respondents agreed with the principle of linking pay 
                                                 
2 Among the surveys to which Makinson would have had access were those of local government employees by 
Heery (1998), and Thompson (1993), of Amersham International (Kessler and Purcell, 1993), and NHS 
managers (Dowling and Richardson, 1998), and the Employment Service, NHS non-medical staff and primary 
and secondary school head teachers (Marsden and French, 1998). 4 
 
to performance, around two thirds in the civil service departments, and rejected the idea that it 
was fundamentally unfair (between a half and two-thirds). It might be the lesser of two evils 
when compared with the perceived inequity of pay systems that reward equally poor and good 
performance, and the limited scope for promotion for most employees. The second lay with 
the line managers, who carried out the performance appraisals, and whom the CEP 
researchers had asked about the impact of performance pay on their staff. A substantial 
minority of these managers (22% and 42% respectively in the 1991, and 1996 Inland Revenue 
surveys) reported that the pay system had led their colleagues to work harder:. Similar 
findings emerged from other parts of the public service covered by the CEP. Later CEP 
research on school teachers in England and Wales, for whom a form of performance pay was 
introduced in the autumn of 2000, similarly found that despite fairly widespread scepticism 
about its fairness and effectiveness among both classroom and head teachers (eg. Wragg et al., 
2001; Mahony et al., 2002 and 2003), other researchers found that there had been a positive 
effect on pupil outcomes (Atkinson et al., 2004; Marsden and Belfield, 2007). The first of 
these studies, emphasising incentives, found that pupils of teachers who were eligible for the 
new performance increases fared relatively better than their peers, and the second, 
emphasising improved goal setting, found that schools in which performance management 
had been more effectively implemented, appeared to perform better than their peers in terms 
of pupil performance. In other words, despite apparent divisiveness and a failure to motivate, 
there were signs that performance pay was somehow contributing to improved performance. 
To understand this paradox, we need to return to two important strands of the overall story. 
The first is that ‘performance pay’ has not been static, and has evolved as managers and other 
stakeholders have learned from past problems and mistakes. The second is that performance 
measurement and goal setting at the organisational level itself has also evolved in ways that 
are important to the success of employee level performance. 
 
One reading of the development of public service performance pay systems over the period 
since the late 1980s is that there has been a process of experimentation and learning leading to 
successive improvements. The first performance pay schemes had been ‘bolted onto’ the pre-
existing performance appraisal systems that had not been designed for pay purposes. Indeed, 
their results had often been secret, and ‘open reporting’ only became widespread with the 
introduction of performance pay and the consequent need for greater transparency. The Inland 
Revenue appraisal scheme in force in 1988 assessed employees on about a dozen criteria 
common to the whole department, such as diligence, cooperativeness, and initiative, and for 
many jobs, only a few of these were relevant. Appraisals were treated like ‘tests’ in which 
employees were graded, to use the metaphor proposed by Folger and Cropanzano (1998). In 
contrast, a ‘trial metaphor’ could be more appropriate because of the need for procedural 
fairness. Some of the problems encountered by the first schemes arose because the linking of 
performance pay to these appraisal systems was felt to be inappropriate and unfair. Many of 
the criteria of good performance were irrelevant to many jobs, and even where they were 
relevant, too little recognition was given to the different abilities of employees. The standard 
criteria were likely to reward always the same employees, while others felt that no matter how 
hard they tried, their efforts would go unrecognised. 
 
The 1993 revised system, ‘Performance Management’, sought to address a number of these 
weaknesses, particularly the perceived lack of fairness. The most important innovation of the 
new scheme was to adopt a ‘contractual approach’ based on agreements about work 
objectives for the coming period to be concluded between individual employees and their 
respective line managers. Their performance at the end of the year would be assessed against 
agreed objectives. This addressed two fundamental questions. The first was that employees 
had different abilities, and that it was just as important to motivate those in the middle as the 
high flyers. The second was that the ‘test metaphor’ was inappropriate for adapting employee 5 
 
performance to new needs, and the multiple criteria gave little guidance as to work priorities. 
By holding a discussion with each employee to agree objectives, managers could now use the 
appraisal process to address new work priorities. The new scheme also marked a definitive 
break with the practice of length of service increments for employees as they progressed up 
the pay scale for their grade. Pay progression within grades would be subject to performance. 
Nevertheless, the CEP surveys found considerable scepticism among employees as many 
thought that the contractual approach existed in name only, and that many line-managers gave 
everyone the same quantitative goals (Marsden and French, 1998, Table 2.8). 
 
The link between performance pay and goal-setting figured even more strongly in the 
performance management schemes for head teachers in primary and secondary schools in 
England and Wales which took force progressively from 1995, and for classroom teachers 
from 2000. In this case, the goals might be specific to individual schools and so vary more 
with local conditions than in large bureaucratic agencies. The accepted wisdom on 
performance pay for school teachers had been that it was inappropriate for their kind of work, 
and it was summarised by Richardson (1999) in a paper commissioned by the largest 
teachers’ union, the National Union of Teachers, and by Dolton et al (2003). Nevertheless, the 
government pressed ahead, capitalising on the earlier experiences by emphasising the place of 
performance pay within a wider system of performance management, which placed as much 
emphasis on goal setting as on evaluation for pay. Performance management in schools 
comprised two components: systematic goal-setting and appraisal for all teachers; and the 
extension of the old classroom teachers’ pay scale with a new ‘upper pay scale’ on which pay 
increments would be performance-based combined with a ‘Threshold Assessment’ required 
for progression onto the new scale. The new appraisal system placed a heavy emphasis on 
personal objectives and development needs, and how these fitted into the goals and priorities 
of the school as embodied in each school’s School Development Plan. The CEP surveys 
found that over 90% of teachers responding reported that they discussed and could influence 
their objectives, that they agreed them with the team leaders and that they referred to items in 
their School Development Plan. Such an approach stands in marked contrast to the approach 
to performance appraisal of the first-generation performance pay schemes. 
 
A general weakness of pay for performance systems, when they depend on judgemental 
assessments, and on agreeing objectives with line managers, is that they can easily revert to 
pay for grade and seniority in practice. Line managers depend on the cooperation of their 
subordinates to get their own jobs done, and this can create a bargaining relationship in which 
it is tempting to use appraisals and easy objectives as a means of buying cooperation. If line 
managers lack support systems from senior management, then they are often isolated, and it 
must be tempting to collude with their subordinates: to go through the motions and fill in the 
forms for goal setting and appraisal but not to worry about the reality. Megaw noted the rarity 
with which pay increments were withheld for poor performance, but did not address the 
organisational pressures which stand in the way of withholding increments. 
Improvements in organisational measures 
The second strand of the story relates to the organisational level, to clarification of 
organisational objectives, for which decentralisation held the key, and to stronger pressures on 
line-managers to take performance seriously, for which better indicators and benchmarking 
were important. As noted earlier, the 1988 Ibbs ‘Next Steps’ report began the movement to 
simplify the structure of the ‘principal’ within the public services, each agency or department 
having its own set of goals and performance criteria. Pay delegation enabled these bodies to 
begin to tackle the task of aligning their reward and employee management systems with their 
newly clarified objectives. The government’s defeat of the civil service unions in 1987 
represented the end of central bargaining over pay, and the beginning of a large-scale 6 
 
movement of decentralisation of human resource management, thus enabling closer 
adaptation of reward systems to the performance demands of each unit. A study by one of the 
public service unions documents how from 1987 pay became increasingly ‘delegated’ to 
departments and government agencies, following the logic of the Next Steps process (PTC, 
1996). The same study showed how pay arrangements had become increasingly diverse 
between agencies. In effect, the new organisational structures, which were geared towards 
providing a narrower and more specific set of services, had begun to acquire greater 
autonomy over their human resource and industrial relations systems. Although at the time it 
was common to associate these moves in the contemporary public debate with privatisation, 
in fact, some countries, such as Sweden, had long used an agency-based structure for the 
delivery of public services without any hint of privatisation because of its greater role clarity.
3 
 
Another important factor in increased organisational efficiency in public services, which has 
also attracted a very bad press for its dysfunctions, is the use of performance targets for 
organisations (e.g. ‘Target practice’, The Guardian 30/04/05). Yet good statistical 
performance measures are also at the heart of coordination within large multi-unit systems, 
such as the national office networks of public agencies, and the school system. Without 
benchmarks between units, higher management faces an almost insoluble problem of 
information asymmetry vis-à-vis lower levels of management. How can a minister or a senior 
manager judge whether a tax office or a hospital is being run efficiently unless its 
performance can be compared with that of similar units elsewhere? Just as with individual 
employees, performance measures can be used both to rank achievements, and as a diagnostic 
tool, enabling top management to ask the right questions of local management. It also enables 
it to identify good local practice that might be generalised, and weak local performance that 
might call for assistance. 
 
The Inland Revenue provides an interesting example. When the author was looking for 
measures of organisational performance that might be compared with the appraisal scores 
awarded to individual employees across units and over time, it became clear that fundamental 
changes had occurred. Just as the first employee performance measures had built on the pre-
existing system for grading employee performance according to fixed criteria, so the first 
organisational measures had focused on accounting measures of performance. The Inland 
Revenue’s annual reports in the late 1980s, when dealing with efficiency, focused on finance 
and on volumes work handled within particular deadlines, such as the percentage of tax 
returns processed within x weeks. By the mid-1990s, as performance management became 
better embedded, the Inland Revenue was also reporting performance measures based on 
statistical sampling, such as the percentage of work done right first time. If employees are 
given incentives to ‘clear post’ under performance pay, then there is an obvious risk that 
quality will suffer. Yet without comparative measures of error rates it is hard for senior 
management to gauge whether the higher rates in one office are due to the complexities of the 
work or to poor management. Local managers might also be under pressure from their staff to 
turn a blind eye to errors in order to help them meet volume targets and qualify for 
performance pay. 
 
Narrowing down the functions of the principal, and developing more reliable and more 
relevant measures of organisational performance, assists central management in sustaining the 
performance of local management. It also provides local management with the guidance and 
discipline needed to operate goal setting, appraisals and performance pay at the local level. 
Arguably, it helps local managers to resist the organisational pressures towards indulgency 
mentioned earlier. 
                                                 
3 I am indebted to Niels Schager of the Swedish public employers for this observation. 7 
 
 
Schools represent an interesting further development of this convergence between individual 
and organisational performance management. This convergence occurs formally in the 
references in individual teachers’ priorities to the objectives outlined in School Development 
Plans, but also through the pressures of the ‘quasi-market’ that exists within the school sector 
to attract pupils as a consequence of parental choice (Glennerster, 2002). The 1988 Education 
Act devolved a number of powers from local authorities onto schools and their governors thus 
giving them greater autonomy. At the same time, the government developed a national 
framework for schools in England and Wales, including establishment of a national 
curriculum, a system for assessing school and pupil performance, with publication of 
performance tables, and external evaluation by inspectors from the Ofsted (Office for 
Standards in Education). The changes were aimed at informing parental choice, and so 
providing quasi-market discipline on school managements. Thus local management had the 
autonomy to manage key resources in schools, but subject to the pressure to attract pupils. 
Schools with good academic results, or which offered special facilities, could hope to attract 
more and better pupils as well as per capita funding. Although schools were not allowed to 
select, attracting a large number of applications from families that value their education 
increases their chances of receiving more able and more motivated pupils. Equally, schools 
which fail to attract such pupils will find themselves recruiting from a more limited pool of 
applicants. Thus, such a quasi-market puts pressure on the management teams in schools to 
ensure they attract motivated students and their families. 
 
Against this background, the introduction of performance management for classroom teachers 
provided the missing part of the jigsaw for those schools that wanted to use it positively. Pupil 
progress had been pressed by the government as one of the key performance criteria for 
teachers. It is one of the few measurable outputs that are relatively independent of 
management indulgency, and it has a special significance for families making their choices 
about which schools their children should attend. At the outset, there was widespread concern 
that using pupil progress would mean return to a discredited system of payment by test results 
that ran from 1863 to 1890 in England (NUT, 1999 §4) or that the link would be applied in a 
formulaic way in many schools.
4 The arguments against, summarised by Richardson (1999) 
and Dolton et al (2003), were that pupil progress depends on the contribution of many 
teachers, and that pupils’ socio-economic background and their own motivation were factors 
that influence progress but over which teachers have little control. Linking pay to pupil 
performance would induce teachers to ‘teach to the test’. In practice, the good practice case 
studies used as guidance by the Education Department highlighted a rather different approach, 
at least in theory, using data on pupil progress to diagnose problems, for example with the 
attainments of particular categories of pupils, and to work out strategies for addressing them 
which could form part of a teacher’s individual or team objectives for the coming year (DfEE, 
2000). The CEP’s interviews with practitioners and its own panel survey work suggested that 
growing numbers of schools, albeit a minority in 2004 (the date of the last survey wave), were 
gradually taking advantage of the new system to integrate classroom performance 
management with school goals and priorities, and that those that did so were achieving 
relatively better pupil test results.  
 
 
                                                 
4 For an account of the nineteenth century system, see (Nelson, 1987). The operation of the scheme was the 
subject of several government reports. The detailed evidence of the Newcastle Commission of 1859 provides the 
background of why it was set up under the Revised Code of 1861.  The Cross Report of 1887 provides the detail 
of why it was disbanded. I am grateful to Peter Dolton for this information. 8 
 
3. The Consequences 
 
Summarising the academic research and private management and union information then 
available, the 2000 Makinson review outlined a number of benefits that could accrue to 
organisations when performance pay schemes are operated well, and by implication, that the 
schemes then in force were failing to achieve. To paraphrase: well operated schemes clarify 
objectives and engage employees more directly with the goals of the organisation; they 
motivate employees by linking an element of compensation to the achievement of targets 
rather than length of service; they reward achievement and identify areas of under 
performance; and they foster a culture based on teamwork and fairness (Makinson, 2000: p.2). 
 
How much should a government be concerned by such consequences is unclear. One 
argument put to the author in an academic seminar was that if the government was using 
closer monitoring through appraisal to pressurise employees to work harder, then many of the 
negative employee judgements reported could be expected. It is the price to pay for making 
people work harder for the same general level of pay. Over time, those who were really 
discontented would leave, those who remained would grow accustomed to the more 
demanding work routines, and new recruits would not know any different. In our 
conversations with some managers, it was acknowledged that staff were working harder and 
efficiency had improved, but there was also concern about sustainability over the longer term. 
 
The reason for concern became evident in the light of events that occurred in 1997 shortly 
after the CEP’s survey at the then Employment Service, and which were reported in the 
Guardian and Financial Times newspapers. The scheme in operation there had shown many of 
the signs of disenchantment, perceived unfairness, and that the feeling that performance 
objectives were just a numbers game. Job placements were one of the key performance 
indicators for both individual employees, and for their offices. In contrast, many employees 
replied that what they liked about their work was helping unemployed people find new jobs, 
and thought they were contributing to a valuable public service (Marsden and French, 1998). 
The way their performance pay scheme worked was that if they took too long with their 
placement interviews, which might help job seekers find a more suitable job, they would risk 
missing their targets, and their pay would suffer. Thus when interview times were squeezed, 
many felt that they were being asked to go for volume rather than quality of placements. 
There is a grey area in recording placements that lead to a job: does one record sending 
someone along to any potential employer as a placement, or does one count only successful 
placements? And should one count placements that last only for a couple of hours, because 
the job seeker realised the job is not suitable? Under normal times, employees are held back 
from manipulating placement data by their view of the intrinsic value of their work. If this is 
eroded, then one might expect more opportunistic use of their discretion. A few weeks after 
the CEP’s survey, a number of reports in the Guardian and Financial Times appeared to the 
effect that employees and offices in the agency were systematically over-reporting job 
placements, according to the journalist, by up to one third. In some cases, according to the 
Guardian, offices were double-counting placements with major employers not just within but 
also between offices. The issue was discussed in Parliament and an internal enquiry set up, 
but it was allowed to lapse after the General Election.
5 
 
                                                 
5. After the union drew their attention to the Guardian reports, the CEP researchers tried on several occasions to 
investigate this further after the election, but it seemed that neither management nor unions wanted to rake this 
up again for obvious reasons.  See Financial Times 29/3/97 ‘Labour paves way for anti-sleaze fight’, and 
Guardian 29/3/97 ‘Jobcentres 'fiddled figures to boost employment statistics'’, and 1/4/97 ‘McDonald's job data 
'abused'’. 9 
 
The lesson would seem to be that if management pressure employees too much, then some of 
the safeguards against abuse that arise from the intrinsic value of the work, such as belief in 
providing a public service, can be undermined. In the Employment Service, it could be argued 
that these beliefs held potentially opportunistic behaviour in check – if you believe your job is 
to help people then there is no point in faking the numbers. If the intrinsic value is 
downgraded, and if employees are also penalised for giving attention to that rather than 
sustaining the desired case throughput, then the system can tip out of control, as appeared to 
happen on that occasion. 
 
 
4. The Paradox: Unintended Consequences – Renegotiation of Performance 
 
If intended consequences are anticipated, then one might take Megaw’s statement of the 
argument as an indication of the likely results anticipated at the time should performance pay 
be adopted. The committee’s consultations had been widespread, and the case was a reasoned 
one. If there was a gamble over risk, it concerned whether managers would have the ability 
and resources to be able to find solutions to the problems that could be expected to emerge on 
the way. Priestley bet one way, and Megaw the other. As can be seen from the story so far, 
the risks were high: potential demotivation of individuals, and the possible loss of control of 
whole performance management systems. On the other side, there were the risks from doing 
nothing: with motivation undermined by limited advancement, by the inequities of good and 
bad performance being equally rewarded, and by lack of opportunity for management to 
underline new work priorities. So far, we have seen that management has been able to learn 
from experience and revise schemes, so there is some justification for Megaw’s optimism. 
This much, one could argue, was anticipated at the beginning. 
 
There were however consequences sketched out neither by Megaw nor by Makinson, but 
which I should like to argue could prove of fundamental importance. This concerns the issue 
of renegotiation of performance standards and priorities, and the creation of channels in which 
such renegotiation could become an on-going process as organisational goals evolve. In some 
cases, this could provide the means for an integrative negotiation between management and 
individual public employees. This could be important also for the private sector, but arguably 
is more so in the public sector where employment protection is stronger, and it is harder to 
dismiss employees who lack motivation of who refuse to accept new work priorities. 
 
A first clue is provided by the Inland Revenue’s experience in which productivity and 
performance seemed to have increased with the development of performance pay even though 
staff found the system divisive and un-motivating. Part of the evidence for this was that, 
depending on the organisation, between a quarter and a half of the line manager respondents 
to the CEP surveys thought that performance pay had caused employees to work harder 
(Marsden and French, 1998: 8). Their view is significant because they carried out the 
performance appraisals on which performance pay was decided. Other organisational 
indicators were also reviewed in Marsden (2004), where the author sought to reconcile these 
two apparently contradictory observations. A key part of the underlying story was about 
renegotiating performance standards rather than motivation. The decisive change came with 
the introduction of annual agreements on work objectives and appraisal and the attribution of 
performance pay according to how well these agreements were achieved. As suggested 
earlier, the previous system generally assumed that the job determined the different 
dimensions of performance, and employees might work more or less well. Its successor 
introduced the idea that within the job, employees might have different and variable priorities, 
and that these could be adjusted by the goal setting process. Clearly, the findings of the 
second CEP survey of the Inland Revenue show that many employees thought their line 10 
 
managers still functioned according to the old model, applying the same targets to everyone, 
and that these were quantitative. But not all employees reported things being this way, and 
substantial numbers experienced the new system of agreeing work priorities and goals in a 
positive way, and they tended to achieve better performance levels as measured by their 
appraisal scores. 
 
In many respects, the CEP study of classroom teachers provides a better illustration of this 
process, in part because of the design of the research, and in part because schools offer 
multiple units in which management actions as well as employee responses can be studied in 
conjunction. In schools too, the initial emphasis had been upon rewards and motivation. When 
introducing the new performance pay package, the Education Secretary spoke of the need to 
motivate: ‘we can only realise the full potential of our schools if we recruit and motivate 
teachers and other staff with the ambition, incentives, training and support’ (DfEE 1999: 5). 
In the first year of operation, 2000, the reaction to the new performance management system 
and the threshold assessment in the great majority of schools was to fill in the government’s 
forms and take the money. This may have been partly due to conservatism, but partly also 
because many schools needed the pay increase to simply retain staff. Without adequate 
numbers of teachers, the finer points of performance management seemed irrelevant in many 
schools. However, interviews with the organisation responsible to implementing the threshold 
indicated that some schools were using the new system not just to ‘fire-fight’ but as an 
opportunity to reform the way they were managed
6. In particular, some head teachers saw it 
as a way to start to refocus the classroom activities of their teachers on the collective goals of 
the school. This line of enquiry was followed up by the CEP survey, which found that that 
growing numbers of schools were beginning to use it as a means of aligning teachers’ 
classroom activities better with the school’s own objectives. By the fourth year of operation, 
the authors estimated that around 20-25% of the schools in their sample had moved to this 
‘reformer’ strategy. Moreover, the schools that did this, tended to outperform their peers in 
terms of the test results of their students (Marsden and Belfield, 2007). 
 
Industrial relations theorists have developed an elaborate theory of problem-solving, or ‘win-
win’, bargaining at the collective level. Thus Walton and McKersie (1965) contrast this form 
of ‘integrative’ bargaining with the more familiar form of ‘distributive’ bargaining that occurs 
in pay negotiations. The same intuition can be applied at the level of individual employees 
within performance management as a way of analysing how performance management and 
performance pay can be used to reorder work priorities. The reason this has to be at the 
individual level is that job performance is delivered by individual employees, and although 
this may be influenced by the culture of the workplace, in many jobs information asymmetries 
mean that managers depend heavily upon the agreement of individual employees to work in a 
particular way. As an example, one might consider the problem in schools at the time of the 
1999 Green Paper. Many teachers have a strong commitment to their professional ethic, and 
believe in the importance of educating the whole person. Speaking of ‘teaching to test’ is the 
common way of denigrating what is felt to be excessive emphasis on exam results. Yet, with 
the quasi-market, schools are under pressure to give more attention to pupil attainments in 
national tests and in exams as they reflect a parental concern about their children’s life 
chances. As mentioned earlier, head teachers could try to impose a greater emphasis on 
teaching aspects of their subjects that lead to exam success as opposed, say, to developing a 
deeper understanding of the issues. However, the monitoring costs would be high unless 
teachers focused on exam success voluntarily. Head teachers might ease the dilemma for their 
colleagues in the classroom by using other resources to free up more of teachers’ time for 
both kinds of teaching, for example by reducing administration. However, there might be no 
                                                 
6 Cambridge Educational Associates. 11 
 
guarantee that this would bring the school much closer to its targets for exam performance. 
Teachers might use most of the extra time for the more general aspects of their subjects. On 
the other hand, if the extra resources are made available as part of a problem-solving 
negotiation, with agreement on resources provided and a commitment to certain outcomes, 
then one can see a greater likelihood of a mutually beneficial outcome, for the teacher’s 
professional satisfaction and the school’s performance needs. What the goal setting and 
appraisal discussions bring to the process is a framework within which such discussion can 
take place, and the outcomes monitored. Performance pay enters less as a source of 
motivation, than as one of the resources management can bring to the negotiation.
7  
 
The unintended consequence of the long road travelled by performance related pay and 
performance management in the public services has been the emergence of a new channel for 
employee voice, this time at the individual rather than the collective level. Voice mechanisms 
have been explored extensively in collective bargaining and in commercial relations
8, but they 
have received little attention in individual employee-management relations. These have 
commonly been conceived as relations of subordination, and this type of thinking is prevalent 
in the idea that managers need to motivate their staff to perform and to define their work 
objectives. The emphasis on subordination obscures an equally important aspect of 
employment relations, namely, that the employment relationship is also a contractual form 
enabling agreement on the supply of labour services in exchange for a wage or a salary. Free 
labour markets and high degree of skill and professional competence such as one finds among 
many public sector occupations results in a considerable degree of individual level bargaining 
power which is reflected in the discretion such employees can exercise in their work. When 
such employees accept a job offer, there is an agreement on mutually acceptable patterns of 
working. If the relationship is a long-term one, it is unlikely that the employer will find these 
remain beneficial forever, and so it will need an opportunity to adjust them to new 
organisational demands. This gives rise to a need for renegotiation of the package of benefits 
to both parties. In the example from schools, the renegotiation has focused on adapting 
teachers’ professional goals in the classroom to those of their schools. In the Inland Revenue, 
an important organisational goal was to try to adopt a more ‘customer-’ or ‘citizen-oriented’ 
approach towards taxpayers which meant greater sensitivity to individual cases. Both 
involved changes in employees’ work priorities. The CEP surveys caution against assuming 
this process has become generalised, and that former ways of managing, or not managing, 
performance have disappeared, but they do show the logic behind it and which could lead to 
wider diffusion. Imposition and compulsory retraining can achieve a certain amount, but on 
their own, without agreement, it is an uphill struggle. Without employee agreement, there 
must remain doubts about sustainability, and loss of control like that at the Employment 
Service, remains a constant threat. 
                                                 
7 This example, and another example based on the CEP work on performance management in the NHS, are 
developed in greater detail and more formally in Marsden (2007). 
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